Abstract: We present polynomial-time interior-point algorithms for solving the Fisher and Arrow-Debreu competitive market equilibrium problems with linear utilities and n players. 
Introduction
We consider the Arrow-Debreu competitive market equilibrium problem which was first formulated by Leon Walras in 1874 [26] . In this problem every one in a population of n players has an initial endowment of a divisible good and a utility function for consuming all goods-own and others. Every player sells the entire initial endowment and then uses the revenue to buy a bundle of goods such that his or her utility function is maximized. Walras asked whether prices could be set for everyone's good such that this is possible. An answer was given by Arrow and Debreu in 1954 [1] who showed that such equilibrium would exist if the utility functions were concave. Their proof was non-constructive and did not offer any algorithm to find such equilibrium prices.
Fisher was the first to consider algorithm to compute equilibrium prices for a related and different model where players are divided into two catalogs: producer and consumer.
Consumers have money to buy good and maximize their individual utility functions; producer sell their goods for money. The equilibrium prices is an assignment of prices to goods so as when every consumer buys an maximal bundle of goods then the market clears, meaning that all the money is spent and all goods are sold. Fisher's model is a special case of Walras' model when money is also considered a commodity so that Arrow and Debreu's result applies.
Eisenberg and Gale [11, 15] gave a convex optimization setting to formulate Fisher's model with linear utility functions. They constructed an concave objective function that is maximized at the equilibrium. Thus, finding an equilibrium became solve a convex optimization problem, and it could be solved by using the Ellipsoid method in polynomial time. Here, polynomial time means that one can compute an approximate equilibrium in a number of arithmetic operations bounded by polynomial in n and log
1
. Devanur et al. [9] recently developed a "combinatorial" algorithm for solving Fisher's model with linear utility functions too 1 . Either the ellipsoid method or the combinatorial algorithm has a running time in the order of O(n 8 log(1/ )). Both approaches, Eisenberg-Gale and Devanur et al., 1 There were critical errors in their initial conference paper, but they corrected them in a journal version.
did not apply to the more general Walras model. The based complexity result seems more appropriate for analyzing these problems because general solutions may be irrational even all input data are rational.
Solving the Arrow-Debreu problem was proved to be more difficult. Eaves [12] showed that the problem with linear utility can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem (e.g. Cottle et al. [7] ) so that Lemke's algorithm could compute the equilibrium, if it existed, in a finite time. It was also proved there that the equilibrium solution values were rational as solutions to an n 2 -dimension system of linear equations of the original rational inputs. In a later paper [13] , Eaves also proved that the problem with Cobb-Douglass utility could be solved in strongly polynomial time of O(n 3 ). Other effective algorithms to solve the problem include Primak [24] , Dirkse and Ferris [10] , and Rutherford [25] , see the excellent survey by Ferris and Pang [14] . None of these are proved to be polynomial-time algorithms.
More recently, however, Jain [16] has showed that Walras's model can be also formulated as a convex optimization, more precisely, a convex inequality problem, so that the Ellipsoid method again can be used in solving it. Remarkably, he found out a clean set of posinomial inequalities to describe the problem which is necessary and sufficient. This set of inequalities can be logarithmically transferred into a set of convex inequality, which technique was used for geometric programming in early 60's. Similar inequalities were written in the past but with additional inequalities, which were not convex transferable, according to Jain.
The goal of this paper is threefold. First, we develop a polynomial-time interior-point algorithm to solve Fisher's model with linear utility. The complexity bound, O(n 4 log 1 ), of the algorithm is significantly lower than either the Ellipsoid or "combinatorial" algorithm mentioned above. Secondly, we present an interior-point algorithm, which is not primaldual, for solving the Arrow-Debreu competitive market equilibrium problem with linear utility. The algorithm has an efficient barrier function for every convex inequality where the self-condordant coefficient is at most 2. Thus, the number of arithmetic operations of the algorithm is again bounded by O(n 4 log 1 ), which is substantially lower than the one obtained by the ellipsoid method. If the input data are rational, then an exact solution can be obtained by solving the identified system of linear equations, such as Eaves' modle, when
, where L is the bit length of the input data. Thus, the arithmetic operation bound becomes O(n 4 L), which is in line with the best complexity bound for linear programming of the same dimension and size.
Finally, we develop a convex optimization setting for Walras' model, and present a continuous path leading to the set of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, similar to the central path developed for linear programming interior-point methods (see, e.g., Megiddo [20] ). The path is derived from the weighted logarithmic utility and barrier functions and the fixed point theorem. The defining equations are bilinear and possess some primal-dual structure for the application of Newton's method.
An interior-point algorithm for solving the Fisher equilibrium
In Fisher's model the players are divided into two catalogs: producer and consumer. Consumer i, i ∈ C, has given money w i to spend and buy good to maximize their individual utility functions; produce j's, j ∈ P , sell their goods for money. The equilibrium prices is an assignment of prices to goods so as when every consumer buys an maximal bundle of goods then the market clears, meaning that all the money is spent and all goods are sold. Eisenberg and Gale [11] gave a convex optimization setting, where, without losing generality, each producer has one unit good:
Here, player i, i ∈ C, has a linear utility function
where u ij ≥ 0 is the given utility coefficient of player i for producer j's good and x ij represents the amount of good bought from producer j by consumer i. They proved that the optimal dual vector of the convex problem is the market clearing price.
Jain has the following economic interpretation. Consider a person, he has some utility function. This utility function is his measurement of his happiness in terms of his own measuring scale. Consider two different persons. They may have two different utility functions.
They may be using different scales or units for measuring their utilities. But suppose these Instead the open market rules depend upon the amount of goods and money brought into the market. So for Eisenberg and Gale, w i is the amount of money the player has. Hence they showed that the open market maximizes the product of utilities, where this product is taken over all the money in the system so that the market is clear. In fact, based on this principal, Eisenberg-Gale showed the existence of an equilibrium for the Fisher model.
The weighted analytic center
The Eisenberg-Gale model can be rewritten as
subject to i∈C
Consider a more general problem
subject to Ax = b,
where given A is an m × n dimension matrix with full row rank and b is a m dimension vector, and w j is the weight on each of the n variables. An x who satisfies the constraint is called a primal feasible solution, while the maximal solution to the problem is called the weighted analytic center.
If the feasible set is bounded and has an interior, the optimality conditions of the weighted analytic center are: )) to compute a solution such that
They start with an approximate analytic center where all weights equal min(w), and then scale them up to w iteratively. It is not clear how their algorithm can be adapted or analyzed when some of w j are zeros, which is the case of Fisher's model (1).
A modified primal-dual path-following algorithm
In this subsection, we modify the standard primal-dual path-following algorithm (e.g., Kojima et al. [19] , Monteiro and Adler [22] and Mizuno et al. [21] ) for solving problems (2) and (1) and analyze their complexity to computing an -solution for any > 0:
Let x > 0 and s > 0 be a primal and dual interior-point point pair such that
where µ represents the duality gap, η is a positive constant less than 1, and
Such a point pair is called an approximate central-path point pair of the primal and dual feasible set.
Now we solve a prima-dual system of linear equations for d x , d y and d s :
Note that d 
Then, we prove that x + and (y
are an interior-point feasible pair, and
where
so that the computation can repeat.
First, it is helpful to re-express d x and d s . Let
Note that
so that p and q represent an orthogonal decomposition of r.
Secondly, from (5,6,8), we have
Moreover, it is also proved in Mizuno et al. [21] that
Thus,
Thus, if we choose constant η such that √ 2η Note that µ is decreased at a geometric rate (1 − η/ √ n) and it starts at max(w). Also, if w j = 0 for some j, then If the predictor and corrector algorithm of Mizuno et al. [21] is used, the quadratic convergence result of [27] applies to solving problem (2). We have 
where L(A, b) is the bit-length of A and b.
These result indicate that the complexity of the Fisher equilibrium problem is completely in line with linear programming of same dimension and size.
Complexity analysis of solving the Fisher equilibrium
In solving Fisher's problem with n producers and n consumers in (1), the number of variables becomes n 2 + n and the number of equalities is 2n. We can assign the initial x 0 such that 
which is between β and 2β. Using at most O(log(n)) interior-point iterations, we will have an interior-point pair satisfying condition (5) (e.g., see [28] ).
Moreover, matrix A of (1) is sparse and each of its columns has at most two nonzeros. In addition to the feasibility conditions, the optimality condition of the Eisenberg-Gale formulation can be written as
Thus, an optimal solution x ij of the Eisenberg-Gale formulation is the solution of the system equations:
where B * is the set of the optimal basic-variables x ij which are positive at the optimal solution.
If we view products p j x ij as new variales y ij , then the system becomes a system of linear equations: 3 An interior-point algorithm for solving the Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium
Again, with out loss of generality, assume that each of the n players has exactly one unit of divisible good, and let player i, i = 1, ..., n, has a linear utility function
where u ij is the given utility coefficient of player i for player j's good and x ij represents the amount of good bought from player j by player i. The main difference between Fisher's and Walras' models is that, in the latter, each player is both producer and consumer and the budget of player i is not given and will be the price assigned to his or her good. Nevertheless, we can still write a (parametric) convex optimization model:
subject to
where we wish to select weights w i 's such that the optimal dual prices equal them respectively.
For given w's, the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of the model are:
where p is the dimension-n optimal dual price vector of the first n equality constraints and π is the dimension-n optimal dual price vector of the second n equality constraints in (12) .
We call the first equation the weighted centering condition, the second the complementarity condition, the third the dual feasibility, and the third and fourth the primal equality.
Next, we will prove that there is indeed a w ≥ 0 such that p i = w i in these conditions, that is, there are (u, x) and (p, π) such that
The self-dual weighted analytic center
where given A is an m × n matrix with full row rank,
and e is the l(≤ m)-dimension vector of all ones.
We prove the following theorem (14) .
Theorem 3. Assume that the feasible set of (14) is bounded and has a nonempty interior, and the dual feasibility
Proof. For any given w 1 , ..., w l ≥ 0, and, without loss of generality, let l j=1 w j = M for some positive constant M , the optimality conditions of (14) are
These conditions are necessary and sufficient since the feasible set of (14) is bounded and has a nonempty interior. 
In general, this mapping may not be one-to-one. But if we let
where y(µ) is the unique solution to
Then, the mapping is one-to-one and continuous from the weighted analytic center theory. Therefore, the result follows from the fixed point theorem.
Theorem 3 establishes an alternative proof of the existence of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. It also implies that the conditions for the self-dual weighted analytic center of the feasible set of (14) can be written as
Note that the system is homogeneous in (y, s) so that we may add a normalizing constraint l j=1 y j = M to the conditions. From the above conditions but excluding the second one, we have
that is, the second condition is implied by the rest of them. This fact was first proved by Jain [16] for the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium problem, which is a special case of problem (14) . (14) is bounded and has a nonempty interior, and the dual feasibility A T y ≥ 0 imply y 1 , ..., y l ≥ 0. Then, the self-dual weighted analytic center of the feasible set of (14) satisfies the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
Corollary 3. Assume that the feasible set of
s j x j = y j , j = 1, ..., l s − A T y = 0, Ax = b, x, s ≥ 0. (16)
A convex minimization formulation
Jain [16] has also shown that p i > 0 for all i under certain rational conditions on u ij in (13) . Thus, by deleting the complementarity condition and substituting u i and π i from the equalities, the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a point (x ij , p j ) that satisfies
Then, the problem can be formulated as the following optimization Phase I problem:
Here θ can be viewed as an inflated units of each player's good, i.e., initially every player pretends to have 1 + θ units of good. Then θ is gradually moved down to 0. One can easily see that the problem is strictly feasible with a suitably large θ. Furthermore, (18), we must have θ ≥ 0.
Lemma 1. For any feasible solution of Problem
Proof. For all i, j, we have
Summing over j of the inequalities, we have
Summing over i of the inequalities, we have
i j
According to Arrow and Debreu [1] , we must also have (18) is θ = 0.
Lemma 2. The minimal value of Problem

The logarithmic transformation and efficient barrier functions
Note that the new problem is a convex optimization problem since e y i −y j is a convex function in y. This type of transformations has been used in Geometric Programming.
The question: is there an efficient barrier function for inequality
The answer is "yes", and its barrier function is
where its self-condordant parameter is 2, see Proposition 5.3.3 of Nesterov and Nemirovskii [23] . One may also construct the dual, the Legendre transformation, of the barrier function.
Thus, we can formulate the problem as a barrier optimization problem:
where the barrier parameter µ > 0. Thus, one can develop an interior-point path-following or potential reduction algorithm to compute an -optimal solution, i.e., θ < . Since the total self-condordant coefficient of the barrier function is O(n Note that this worst-case complexity bound is significantly lower than the Ellipsoid method used by Jain [16] .
Alternative optimization setting
An alternative Phase I problem is
Initially, θ > 1, which is an inflated factor for the utility value. The problem is to drive θ to 1.
Let y i = log p i , ∀i and κ = log θ. Then problem (18) becomes
Again, the new problem is a convex optimization problem since e
is a convex function in y and κ, and the minimal value of the problem is 0.
Rounding to the exact solution
Eaves [12] showed that the Arrow-Debreu problem with linear utility can be formulated as a complementarity problem, where an optimal solution x ij and price p is the solution of the homogeneous system:
Again, if we view products p j x ij as new variales y ij , then the system becomes a homoge- Our result is a significant improvement over the ellipsoid method of Jain.
A path to the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
Now, we move our attention to whether there is a direct interior-point algorithm in solving the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium problem, similar to the primal-dual path-following algorithm for linear programming and the Fisher equilibrium. Such an algorithm may have many economical and practical appears.
Consider the convex optimization problem for a fixed scalar 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and a nonnegative weight vector w with i w i = n 2 :
Economic interpretations
The objective of (23) Mike Todd also pointed out that the objective function is really the convex combination of the two different utility functions, one is un-weighted and the other is weighted, representing two different idealisms.
The fixed point theorem
Unlike Fisher's problem, we really don't know how much money w each player possesses in
Walras' model-it is up to what prices p i 's assigned to them, since they have to sell their goods at these prices for revenues. But prices are the optimal dual variables or Lagrangian multipliers of the n equality constraints in (23) . Then, the natural question is, is there a vector w such that the optimal dual prices of (23) equal to w i 's, respectively. We give an affirmative answer in the following theorem. Proof. When µ = 1, i.e., the tax rate equals 1, the (unique) prices would be
Consider 0 ≤ µ < 1. Denote the compact simplex by
From the convex optimization theory, the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of an x in (23) are
where p j is the optimal dual price or Lagrangean multiplier for equality constraint j. The first set of constraints is dual feasibility, the second set is called complementarity, and the last two are primal feasibility.
Summing up the complementarity equation over i and noting i x ij = 1, we have
Summing the above equation over j, we have
That is, p ∈ S(n 2 ). For given u ij 's and fixed µ ≥ 0, we may think p ∈ S(µ) being a mapping
, that is, p(w) is a mapping from the simplex to itself. From the Fixed Point Theorem, there exists w ∈ S(n 2 ) such that
which completes the proof.
Note that summing up the complementarity equation in (24) over j when w = p, we
That is, the individual payment spent by player i equals his net income (after tax) plus nµ which can be viewed as a tax amount refunded back to each player uniformly.
The case µ = 0
When µ = 0, with p = w = p(w), the optimality conditions (24) become (13) , which is exactly the necessary and sufficient conditions for p being an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium price vector.
There may be academic advantage of our constructed proof, however. Since both the primal and dual solutions of the strictly convex optimization are unique interior points for any given 0 < µ ≤ 1, they can be written as (x ij (µ), y i (µ), q i (µ), p i (µ)).
Similar to the central path theory of linear programming (e.g., [20] ), we have Jain has pointed [17] out that existence proof of Theorem 5 can also be done using a thought experiment without even referring to convex programs. Suppose we have an Arrow-Debreu setting. Suppose every player non-deterministically guesses his potential income w i 's. He takes an advance loan from a bank based on his potential income. He goes to the market with that money. There the market becomes Fisher setting. He sells his goods according to the Fisher equilibrium p i (w)'s. If it turns out that the amount of money he makes is the same as the loan he took from the bank then the non-deterministic guesses agents made were an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Note that, Fisher setting guarantees that the summation of p i (w)'s is the same as the summation of w i 's as indicated in our proof. So using the fixed point theorem there is a set of correct guesses. An advantage of this "thought" proof is that it works even for non-linear and concave utilities.
The general self-dual weighted analytic center introduced in this paper seems to have more application in matrix games and other fixed-point problems. We expect more equilibrium problems can be transferred to convex optimization problem where efficient interiorpoint algorithms may apply.
Other questions remain, such as how to handle general concave utility functions? Some answers have been given by Codenotti, Jain, Varadarajan and Vazirani [4, 5, 6] . Are there direct primal-dual interior-point algorithms for solving the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium? The path developed in this paper may give an answer.
